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LOCATING THE REGULATION OF DATA
PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY
Edward J. Janger
In our 2007 Article on notification of security breaches, Paul Schwartz
and I explored the concept of a centralized response agent to help
coordinate private and public efforts to respond to data spills.1 In that
Article, we were agnostic about whether the coordinated response agent
should be public or private, and if public where, institutionally, it should be
situated.2 An important element of that agnosticism was our retrospective
focus. We were concerned with response to breaches that had already
occurred. The question of regulating data security and privacy is, of course,
broader, encompassing the formulation of norms for appropriate data use,
data protection, and breach response.3 In this essay, I will briefly address
my agnosticism, and ask, more broadly, which institutions might best
handle the generation and enforcement of legal entitlements regarding
invasions of privacy and data security breaches.
The occasion for asking this question is the recent enactment of the
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which creates, as a
crucial component of efforts to reregulate the banking industry, a Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or the Bureau).4 The principal goal of
the new Bureau will be to examine consumer credit instruments as products
to ensure that they are “safe” for consumers to “use.”5 The proposal for such
an agency, made initially by Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill, was
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1. Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 913 (2007) [hereinafter Schwartz & Janger, Data Security Breaches].
2. See id. at 961.
3. We have addressed these questions as well in earlier work, both together and separately.
See generally Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information
Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (2002) [hereinafter Janger &
Schwartz, Limits on Default Rules]; Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs and
the Anticommons, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 899 (2003) [hereinafter Janger, Anticommons]; Edward J.
Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801 (2003) [hereinafter Janger, Muddy Property].
4. At the time of the Symposium, the proposal for the “Bureau” was embodied in the
Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. § 111 (2009). In
July, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Title X of that Act was called the Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2010. Id. Instead of creating a separate agency, that Act created a
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau within the Federal Reserve Bank. Id.
5. Id.
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based on two linked insights.6 First, that modern consumer credit
instruments—be they mortgages, credit cards, or debit cards—are just as
much products as a toaster.7 And second, that while there is a consumer
products safety commission that is tasked with ensuring the safety of
toasters, there is no similar agency tasked with ensuring that financial
products are safe.8 Warren and Bar-Gill note that there is a congeries of
agencies that have some jurisdiction over consumer financial protection—
the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and so on.9 Most of these agencies have as their focus
the regulation of the banking system, rather than the protection of a bank’s
customers.10 The FTC alone focuses on consumer protection, but its
jurisdiction is spread across the market generally.11
The discussion of the CFPB might not, at first glance, seem relevant to
questions of data privacy in the payment system. Indeed, much of the
discussion of the safety of consumer financial products has focused on the
credit and repayment terms associated with credit cards and mortgages.12
But the use and security of data gathered and transferred in credit and
payment card transactions is every bit as much a danger of these products as
over-indebtedness.13 Identity theft and invasion of privacy are harms
associated with these products. Moreover, the contracting process
associated with such non-price terms is particularly prone to lemons
equilibria, and hence even more problematic than that relating to the price
of credit.14 Therefore, it is fair to ask whether data privacy and data security
ought to be included in the mission of the CFPB.
In this essay, I will explore whether locating regulation of data privacy
and data security in the CFPB would be beneficial, or whether jurisdiction
would be better left to the existing regulators. I argue that responsibility for
protecting personal information would best be split in two. The generation
of privacy and data security norms can—and probably should—be situated
6. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 98–100
(2008).
7. See id. at 3–6.
8. See id. at 4–5.
9. See id. at 86.
10. See id. at 85.
11. See id. at 86.
12. Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality,
Behaviorism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1513
(2006).
13. See infra Part I.C (discussion on Hannaford Brothers and TJX Companies).
14. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 41 (2d ed. 1997);
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970); Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in
Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 49 (1993); Janger & Schwartz,
Limits on Default Rules, supra note 3, at 1240–41; Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions,
Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561, 561 (1977).
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in an agency like the CFPB. By contrast, measures for responding to data
spills might best be coordinated by the existing banking-focused agencies.
Finally, regulation of data security precautions should be shared between
the consumer protection agency and the bank regulatory agency.
This Article will proceed in three steps. First, I will explain the
differences between data privacy and data security, and describe the
existing regulatory architecture. In the second part, I will explore the
various ways in which data privacy and data security norms can be
fashioned, starting with contract, then self-regulation, and finally methods
of public regulation. Third, I will discuss the possibility that, while the
CFPB has a role to play in regulating data privacy and data security, there
are important differences between norm generation for data privacy, data
security, and loss mitigation that suggest different locations for regulatory
authority. I will argue that the proposed CFPB has an important role to play
in the formulation of the data privacy and data security norms that govern
consumer relationships with their banks. By contrast, loss mitigation may
be more appropriately handled through industry self-regulation, or through
the regulatory institutions that are focused on systemic risk.
I. DATA PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY
Data privacy and data security are closely related concepts, but they are
not the same. Data privacy requires that data be kept secure, but data may
be kept secure for reasons other than privacy.15 Entities that wish to hold
their data secure may not care at all about the privacy of those who
disclosed the data.16 So first, it is important to define terms. If data privacy
is viewed as the power to keep data secluded and safe from view, then data
privacy and data security are the same. This conflation turns, however, on
the mistaken view that data privacy is purely about concealment. This is
only partially true. In all contexts that matter, data privacy involves a
bilateral or multilateral relationship between a discloser and a recipient, or
recipients, of information.17 Privacy is not usually about data concealment,
it is about enforcing norms and expectations with regard to data sharing.18

15. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1663
(2001) (describing the “data seclusion deception”). The conflation of privacy and security arises
from the mistaken impression that data privacy is actually about keeping data private. Id.
16. For example, data aggregators such as Choice Point or credit reporting agencies gather
personal information, and keep it secure, not because they care particularly about consumer
expectations of privacy, but because information is their stock-in-trade. Schwartz & Janger, Data
Security Breaches, supra note 1, at 922–23.
17. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 1660 (“We can refer to these ideas as . . . the ‘autonomy
trap’ and . . . the ‘data seclusion deception.’”); see also ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL
DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 51–88 (1995). See generally Robert C.
Post, The Social Foundations Of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 957 (1989).
18. See Janger, Anticommons, supra note 3, at 904–08.
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In the payment system, for example, a purchaser reveals his or her
identity and account information to a merchant, the merchant passes that
information through a data conduit to the clearance network, the availability
of funds or credit is verified, and the transaction is processed.19 Along the
way, at least four entities are given access to potentially sensitive personal
information. The merchant learns the customer’s name, credit card number,
and purchasing preferences. Some or all of that information is also passed
to the merchant’s bank, the clearance network (i.e., Visa, MasterCard,
Amex), and to the customer’s bank.20 All of these disclosures may be fairly
characterized as consistent with the primary purpose of the discloser—
accomplishing payment.
Data privacy refers to the norms which govern information sharing and
the permitted secondary uses of disclosed information by each of the
entities that handle or come into possession of personal information.21 The
touchstone is the discloser’s reasonable expectations of privacy.22 Privacy
norms govern what happens once these various entities have identifiable
personal information about the discloser. What may they do with that
information? With whom may they share it? What secondary uses of
personal information are permitted to the recipients of that information?
Data security, by contrast, regulates the procedures for ensuring that the
disclosed information remains where the parties to the transaction intend
and may be accessed only by people who are authorized.23 Thus, a privacy
violation usually involves an intentional act by the information recipient

19. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, ELIZABETH WARREN, DANIEL KEATING & RONALD J. MANN,
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 317 (4th ed. 2009).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
877 passim (2003); Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 717, 720 (2001); Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1347 (2000); Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring
Americans’ Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 773 (1999). See also
Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343 passim
(2008); Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstanding of Privacy, 44
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 754–60, 767–70 (2007). See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006) (developing a new taxonomy for privacy, focusing on
activities that invade privacy); Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of
Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003) (conceptualizing privacy and advocating for
protections that shape this concept).
22. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier
for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 221–27 (1992) (discussing various types of
actionable invasions of privacy in the common law and the general requirement that there be a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the appropriated information) [hereinafter Reidenberg,
Frontier for Individual Rights].
23. Compare Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 § 501, 15 U.S.C. §
6801 (2006) (stating that a financial institution “shall establish appropriate standards . . . (3) to
protect against unauthorized access”), with id. § 6802 (stating that a financial institution “may not
. . . disclose . . . to a nonaffiliated third party any nonpublic personal information”).
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that violates the expectations of the receiver.24 A security violation, by
contrast, may involve a violation of a duty of care,25 but it rarely—if ever—
involves an intentional disclosure of information.26 These differences
suggest that different approaches may be necessary for generating and
enforcing data security and data privacy norms.
A. DATA PRIVACY AND GLB
Until recently, the principal regulation governing data privacy in the
payment system was the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act27 (GLB).28 Section 501
of the Act creates an obligation to protect the privacy of customer data.29
Section 502 gives some limited heft to that obligation, requiring notice and
an opportunity to opt out of any sharing of data with a non-affiliate, and
limiting the reuse of that information by non-affiliates.30 This regime has
been criticized for killing trees with relatively useless privacy notices, for
providing precious little data privacy protection because affiliate sharing is
permitted, and because the opt-out rule sets the default in favor of nonaffiliate sharing.31
As a result, the onus for developing privacy standards, and establishing
enforceable privacy rights, rests on consumers’ willingness and ability to
contract for protection. In other words, if a consumer wishes to limit the
sharing of her data, she must affirmatively opt out of data sharing, and, to
the extent she wishes to limit affiliate sharing, she will have to negotiate for
it.32 In most cases this will mean foregoing the commercial relationship
with the financial institution. The limits of consumer contracting and the
problem of contracts of adhesion have been well discussed elsewhere.33
Paul Schwartz and I have discussed it specifically in the context of GLB,
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Reidenberg, Frontier for Individual Rights, supra note 22, at 222–23.
Id. at 223–24.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 6801.
See generally Schwartz & Janger, Data Security Breaches, supra note 1.
15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (“It is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has an
affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the
security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal information.”).
30. Id. § 6802.
31. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the 2001 Privacy
Conference: Protecting Consumers’ Privacy: 2002 and Beyond (Oct. 4, 2001),
http://ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002.shtm.
32. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193,
1246–67 (1998); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic
Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2402–04 (1996); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the
Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53–67 (1997) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Privacy Economics]; Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The
Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1101–13 (1999); see also
Janger & Schwartz, Limits on Default Rules, supra note 3, at 1221.
33. C & J Fertilizer. Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975); see
generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173 (1983).
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and found the result unsatisfactory.34 We concluded that the likely product
of GLB’s notice and opt-out regime is a lemons equilibrium in which bad
privacy practices prevail.35 We raised these issues in 2002, and nothing that
has happened since then has led us to question these conclusions. Instead
the focus of regulatory concern has been identity theft, which is really not a
“privacy” problem at all. The reasons for this shift of focus are discussed
below.
B. DATA SECURITY AND GLB § 501(B)
GLB has relatively little to say on the subject of data security, but
curiously, that is where the action has been.36 Section 501 of GLB consists
principally of a delegation to the agencies that govern financial
institutions.37 It provides in full:
(b) Financial institutions safeguards
In furtherance of the policy in subsection (a) of this section, each
agency or authority described in section 505(a) of this title shall
establish appropriate standards for the financial institutions
subject to their jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical,
and physical safeguards—
(1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records
and information;
(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the
security or integrity of such records; and
(3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such
records or information which could result in substantial harm or
inconvenience to any customer.38

It instructs the various bank supervisory agencies to develop regulations
for handling customer data, such as PIN numbers, social security numbers,
and other data that might create a risk of, among other things, identity

34. Janger & Schwartz, Limits on Default Rules, supra note 3, at 1230–32.
35. Craswell, supra note 14, at 49. Richard Craswell states:
Because terms that are good for buyers are generally more expensive for sellers, any
seller that offers better terms will charge a higher price to make the same level of
profits she could make by offering less favorable terms at a lower price. However, if
most buyers have good information about prices but only poor information about nonprice terms, they may not notice an improvement in non-price terms, while they will
definitely notice the higher price. As a result, many buyers may stop purchasing from
this seller.
Id.

36. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006).
37. Id. § 6801(b).
38. Id.
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theft.39 In response, the various bank supervisory agencies promulgated the
Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to
Customer Information and Customer Notice that mandates risk assessments
and the creation of a response program by financial institutions.40 In
addition, the regulations contemplate a two-tier system of reporting security
breaches.41 Any security breach must be reported to the financial
institution’s supervising agency.42 If, after an investigation, it appears that
there is risk to the consumer, then notice of the security breach must also be
given to the consumer.43 While the Interagency Guidance is not perfect, it
does mandate a relatively comprehensive architecture for managing
sensitive personal financial data.44 The delegation contained in § 501(b)
could have been exercised in any number of ways. But, unlike privacy, the
task of regulating data security has not been left to contract. Data security
has been regulated more robustly than secondary use.
C. SELF REGULATION AND STANDARD SETTING—PCI DSS
The regulation of data security has not been limited to government
agencies. The payment card industry has taken it upon itself to engage in
self regulation in this area through the creation of the Payment Card
Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC).45 The PCI SSC consists of
the entities responsible for clearing payment card transactions—Visa,
MasterCard, American Express. This group has promulgated a series of
protocols called the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard or PCI
DSS.46 This standard is intended to form the basis for auditing the security
practices of participants in the payment card clearance system.47 The PCI
DSS standard requires participants in the payment system, in broad outline,
to:
39. Id. §§ 6801(a), 6804(a)(1); Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized
Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,752 (Mar. 29,
2005), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/pdf/05-5980.pdf.
40. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. at 15,751–54.
41. Id. at 15,752; see also Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, Anonymous Disclosure of
Security Breaches: Mitigating Harm and Facilitating Coordinated Response, in SECURING
PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 223, 227 (Anum Chander, et al. eds., 2008).
42. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. at 15,752.
43. Id.
44. Schwartz & Janger, Data Security Breaches, supra note 1, at 920.
45. PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, http://www.pcisecuritystandards.org (last visited
Dec. 30, 2010).
46. PCI SSC Data Security Standards Overview, PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml (last visited Dec. 30,
2010).
47. Doug Drew & Sushila Nair, Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard in the Real
World, INFO. SYS. CONTROL J., 1 (Sept./Oct. 2008), http://www.isaca.org/Journal/PastIssues/2008/Volume-5/Documents/jpdf0805-payment-card-industry.pdf.
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1. Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data.
2. [N]ot use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other
security parameters.
3.

Protect stored cardholder data.

4.

Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks.

5. Use and regularly update anti-virus software [on all systems
commonly affected by malware].
6.

Develop and maintain secure systems and applications.

7.

Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-to-know basis.

8.

Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access.

9.

Restrict physical access to cardholder data.

10. Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder
data.
11. Regularly test security systems and processes.
12. Maintain a policy that addresses information security. 48

Notwithstanding the implementation of PCI DSS, there have been
numerous data spills. Indeed, Hannaford Brothers and TJX Companies were
both hacked in 2008.49 Ironically, Hannaford received its certification one
day after being made aware of a two-month compromise of its internal
system.50 The proponents of PCI DSS point out that PCI DSS compliance is
assessed at a specific moment in time, and that none of the entities that have
been breached was actually complying with the PCI DSS protocol at the
time of its breach.51 They lay the blame, not on the protocols, but on the
implementation of compliance validation procedures.52

48. Id. at 2.
49. Brian Krebs, Three Alleged Hackers Indicted in Large Identity-Theft Case, WASH. POST,
Aug. 18, 2009, at A11; Dan Goodin, TJX Suspect Indicted in Heartland, Hannaford Breaches,
THE REGISTER (Aug. 17, 2009, 8:49 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/08/17/heartland_pay
ment_suspect.
50. Middleware Audits and Remediation for PCI Compliance: The New Frontier of PCI,
EVANS RES. GRP., 1 (2009), http://www.evansresourcegroup.com/partners.html (follow “Read our
Whitepaper: Middleware Audits and Remediation for PCI Compliance: The new frontier of PCI”
hyperlink at bottom of page).
51. Jaikumar Vijayan, Post-Breach Criticism of PCI Security Standard Misplaced, Visa Exec
Says, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 19, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9130073/Post_breach_criticism_of_PCI_security_standard_misplaced_Visa_exec_says. See also
Goodin, supra note 49; Kim Zetter, TJX Hacker Charged with Heartland, Hannaford Breaches,
WIRED (Aug. 17, 2009, 2:34 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/08/tjx-hacker-chargedwith-heartland/.
52. Andrew Conry Murray, PCI and the Circle of Blame, NETWORK COMPUTING (Feb. 23,
2008), http://networkcomputing.com/data-protection/pci-and-the-circle-of-blame.php.
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Interestingly, the payment card industry has proven much more
interested in creating norms and an architecture for protecting data security
than in articulating data sharing norms.53 One might point to the emergence
of private issuers of “privacy seals,” such as Trust-E and Secure Scan, but
the recent FTC settlement with ControlScan suggests that this market
solution is far from perfect.54 In that case, a privacy seal provider was
shown to have regularly failed to verify the privacy practices of the
merchants it endorsed.55
D. CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS
This brief review of the regulatory architecture raises a number of
questions. First, why do the regulating agencies seem inclined to leave the
creation and enforcement of data privacy norms to the law of contracts,
while taking a more proactive approach to protecting data security? Second,
why hasn’t the market responded through competition over privacy
practices? And third, what does this tell us about the appropriate
government approach to regulating data privacy as compared to data
security?
II. SOURCES OF REGULATION: COMMON LAW, CONTRACT
AND REGULATION
To decide whether public regulation is necessary one starts by asking
whether there is a market failure.56 That question further turns on whether,
left to themselves, the combination of private contracting behavior, contract
law, and tort law will produce optimal regulation. The answer to this
question in the context of data privacy and security may be too obvious to
bear discussion. To the extent that contract is involved, Susan Block-Lieb
and I, as well as Oren Bar-Gill, have written at length about the extent to
which consumers make cognitive and heuristic errors in deciding whether
to enter into consumer credit transactions.57 Consumers, it turns out, are
notoriously bad at figuring out how much it is going to cost them to borrow
money; they are also relatively bad at making inter-temporal comparisons
between consumption in the present and consumption in the future.58 There
is, moreover, a considerable literature on the extent to which consumers are

53. Evan Schuman, FTC: Web Site Security Seals are Lies, CBSNEWS.com, Mar. 5, 2010,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/05/opinion/main6270104.shtml.
54. Id. (discussing the “bogus” security verification supplied by ControlScan in the context of
the FTC settlement).
55. Id.
56. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 389 (7th ed. 2007).
57. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 12–13; Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 12, at 1489–
90.
58. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 29–33.
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even worse at negotiating over the non-price terms of contracts.59 What is
clear is that consumers are not good at bargaining over either privacy or
data security. As such, relying on contract to establish data privacy and
security norms will place all of the power in the hands of the financial
institutions that receive the information.60
While comparing bad to worse may not be profitable, it is possible that
consumers’ ability to bargain over data security is even worse than their
ability to bargain over privacy terms. Consumers may be able to articulate
their expectations about how their information might be used in broad
terms.61 This failure of imagination and lack of information is even worse
for data security. Consumers cannot be expected to understand or monitor
the data security practices of their banks. And, while, from time to time,
banks compete on the basis of data security,62 as far as consumers are
concerned, their claims are entirely unverifiable. Indeed, the time when
most financial institutions spend the most advertising about data security is
after they have been subject to a breach.63
Where bargaining is impossible, as with data security, the natural
common law substitute is tort law.64 The law of negligence might be
expected to step in to establish data security norms. The problem with
relying on common law enforcement through private litigation is that even
when consumers discover that they have been the victims of identity theft it
is virtually impossible for the consumer to discover the source of the
breached data.65 Thus, most data security breaches are likely to escape
detection, and hence financial institutions are unlikely to fully internalize
the costs associated with lax security practices.
For these reasons, it is not surprising that contract and tort have not
provided adequate protection of either data privacy or data security. Thus, it
would appear that some form of regulatory response would be appropriate
for determining what data privacy terms should be embodied in consumer
credit and consumer payment contracts. Similarly, the nature of the
obligation to prevent data theft, fraud, or identity theft will have to be
created by public processes. Finally, the architecture for responding to data
spills will likely require some degree of public coordination.

59. Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88
MICH. L. REV. 489, 505–08 (1989).
60. Schwartz & Janger, Data Security Breaches, supra note 1, at 927; Joseph Turow et al., The
Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Privacy in the Coming Decade, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 723, 730–32 (2007).
61. But even here there may be a failure of imagination. Few consumers realize how many
hands information passes through in completing a transaction.
62. Schwartz & Janger, Data Security Breaches, supra note 1, at 948.
63. Id.
64. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 125–
26 (1970).
65. Schwartz & Janger, Data Security Breaches, supra note 1, at 962–63.
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III. THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AS A
REGULATOR OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY
As noted above, in their 2008 article, Elizabeth Warren and Oren BarGill proposed the creation of an independent consumer financial protection
agency.66 The tasks of such an agency would be to review the various
consumer credit products offered to consumers to ensure that they were
safe.67 A CFPB is part of the financial reform bill that was enacted this
year.68 The financial reform bill is over 1300 pages long, but the key
provisions are §§ 1031 and 1032. Section 1031 grants power to the Bureau
to promulgate regulations that prohibit unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts or
practices.69 Section 1032 authorizes the Bureau to mandate certain
disclosures, and to create loan forms that, if used, provide a safe harbor
from liability.70
The principal focus in discussion of these sections has been the
financial terms associated with such consumer credit products. Modern
products, including credit cards and home mortgages, have often been
designed expressly to hide their true costs.71 Back end fees, teaser rates,
default rates, negative amortization, and balloon payments are just a few of
what Warren describes as the “tricks and traps” that have become standard
practices in the consumer credit market and, in particular, the subprime
market.72 Warren and Bar-Gill proposed an agency that would examine
such products for transparency and would examine marketing practices to
ensure that loans were only extended to people for whom they were
appropriate.73 The absence of such regulation played an important role in
the financial meltdown of the last few years.
Institutional competence is at the heart of Warren and Bar-Gill’s
argument for a CFPB.74 It is not that statutory protections did not exist for
consumers in credit transactions. Their concerns were the related problems
of regulatory capture and diffusion of responsibility.75 Warren and Bar-Gill
were concerned instead that too many agencies had jurisdiction over
consumer protection, but none had it as its core purpose.76 The FDIC, the

66. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 98.
67. Id. at 98–99.
68. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964–65 (2010).
69. Id. § 1031.
70. Id. § 1032.
71. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 54–55.
72. Id. at 56.
73. Id. at 98–100; see also Susan Block-Lieb & Edward Janger, Demand-Side Gatekeepers in
the Market for Home Loans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 465, 495 (2009).
74. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 74.
75. Id. at 99–100, nn. 323, 325.
76. Bar-Gill & Warren state:
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OCC, and the Federal Reserve all had some responsibility for consumer
protection, but their core function was protecting the safety and soundness
of the banking system.77 By contrast, the FTC had consumer protection as a
core function, but little expertise with financial products.78
While the CFPB’s intended focus is on lending products, and on the
credit function associated with payment cards, the use of credit cards as
payment devices raises a different set of safety issues that might be handled
similarly by such an agency. Data privacy and data security are just as much
terms of the credit/payment card contract as is the interest rate. And, if
anything, they are less transparent. The question therefore is not, could the
CFPB mandate include data privacy and data security; the question is
whether it should, as a matter of comparative institutional competence.
In considering whether the CFPB would be an appropriate regulator of
financial privacy and security, the divide between data privacy and data
security is instructive. While legislation and regulation at the federal level
have not been perfect in either category, the regulations promulgated under
§ 501(b) relating to data security are far more thoughtful than those relating
to data privacy.79 Similarly, to the extent that self regulation has had any
impact whatsoever, it has had influence on the data security side.80
This discrepancy may be traceable to the intrinsic difference between
data privacy and data security. Where data privacy is involved, there is an
inherent conflict of interest between consumers and banks. Consumers
expect their data to be kept confidential, and expect secondary use to be
narrowly cabined. The financial institutions would like to have as much
discretion as possible in how they use personal information. They have
every incentive to contract for broad discretion, and to ensure that
legislation does not interfere with their ability to use information as they
desire.
By contrast, where data security is involved, the conflict of interest
between consumer and financial institution has a different contour. While
financial institutions do have an incentive to limit the extent to which
contracts or legal regulations might lead to the imposition of liability, they

This litany of agencies, limits on rulemaking authority, and divided enforcement
powers results in inaction. No single agency is charged with supervision over any single
credit product that is sold to the public. No single agency is charged with the task of
developing expertise or is given the resources to devote to enforcement of consumer
protection. No single agency has an institutional history of protecting consumers and
assuring the safety of products sold to them.
Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 93–95.
78. Id. at 95–96.
79. See supra Part I.B.
80. See supra Part I.C.
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also have a relatively strong interest in ensuring that personal data remains
secure.
This interest is not a product of their particular interest in data security.
Instead, it is a product of the risk of loss rules that govern parties in the
payment system. One can go as far back as the rule in Price v. Neal,81 and
the properly payable rule under 4-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) to see that the risk of fraud is placed, in the first instance, on the
bank that fails to detect it.82 If a financial institution honors an unauthorized
check, it must re-credit the account.83 Similarly, under the Truth in Lending
Act (TILA), the credit card bank must re-credit the account if an
unauthorized charge is made on a credit card.84 While, in both cases, it may
be possible for the paying bank to push liability down to the merchant who
initially took the check or accepted the card, the loss is going to rest on a
bank, not on the consumer. In this regard, banks have every incentive to
make sure that data remains secure. This interest is reflected in the self
regulation that produced a program like PCI DSS. Here, the alignment
between the banking industry and the bank regulatory agencies may be a
plus rather than a minus.
This alignment of interest between consumers and financial institutions
appears to be reflected as an alignment of interest between regulators and
the regulated. There are types of coordination and response that cannot be
handled by one firm alone. Neither can a consortium of private actors
accomplish such coordination without public assistance.
PCI DSS and the Hannaford data spill offer an example of both the
promise of self regulation and its limits. PCI DSS may be a well considered
and effective standard for protecting data security, but the standard setting
body has limited power to enforce the standards it sets.85 It can audit
participants in the payment system.86 It can deprive victims of data spills
membership going forward, but it cannot, in any meaningful way, punish,
and it has limited power to exclude members.87
By contrast, the existence of a standard such as PCI DSS may work
effectively in conjunction with tort law to set the standard by which
negligence might be judged, after the fact. PCI DSS could provide a
framework for regulatory agencies to include or exclude participants from
the payment system.
81. Price v. Neal, (1762) 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B.) 871–72; 3 Burr. 1354, 1357. The rule in
Price v. Neal places the risk of loss for a forged check on the depositors’ bank that pays the
instrument without noticing that the signature is forged. Id.
82. See U.C.C. § 4-401 (2002).
83. Id.
84. Truth in Lending Act of 1968 § 133, 15 U.S.C. 1643 (2006); Truth in Lending (Regulation
Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (2007).
85. Drew & Nair, supra note 47, at 1.
86. Id. at 1–2.
87. Id.
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Note here, however, that the pattern I am describing for data security is
very different from the one the CFPB would establish for defining terms.
This pattern involves cooperation among a self-regulatory organization, the
industry, and the agency. This is the sort of cooperation that might best be
accomplished through the OCC or Federal Reserve where the goal is the
safety and soundness of the financial system, and protection (for better or
worse) of the industry itself. By contrast, where data privacy is involved,
such a cooperative relationship is anathema to the function of protecting
consumers.
CONCLUSION
As such, and in conclusion, it appears that it may be desirable to split
the regulation of data privacy and data security in two. The articulation of
data security and data privacy norms might properly be entrusted to the
CFPB. An agency focused on consumer protection is in the best position to
generate and impose the default terms relating to privacy and security that
will find their way into consumer credit and payment contracts. However,
the regulation of data protection procedures, and the development of
programs for mitigating the harm caused by security breaches would best be
handled by the bank regulatory agencies themselves.

